Reference P380 365 Sears Stephen The American Heritage Century Collection of Civil War Art

1862 invasion of Northern U.s.a.

Maryland campaign
Office of the American Civil State of war
Spousal relationship Full general George B. McClellan and Confederate Full general Robert East. Lee, the principal commanders of the campaign
Date September iv–20, 1862 Location Maryland Outcome Union victory
Belligerents
United States	Confederate States
Commanders and leaders
George B. McClellan	Robert E. Lee
Units involved
Army of the Potomac	Army of Northern Virginia
Force
102,234[1] [ii]	55,000[2]
Casualties and losses
28,272 total (ii,783 killed; 12,108 wounded; 13,381 captured/missing)[3] [4]	fifteen,229 total (2,512 killed; 10,591 wounded; one,826 captured/missing)[5]

The Maryland campaign (or Antietam campaign) occurred September 4–xx, 1862, during the American Civil War. Amalgamated Gen. Robert Eastward. Lee's commencement invasion of the Northward was repulsed by the Army of the Potomac under Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, who moved to intercept Lee and his Army of Northern Virginia and eventually attacked it nigh Sharpsburg, Maryland. The resulting Boxing of Antietam was the bloodiest single-twenty-four hours battle in American history.

Post-obit his victory in the northern Virginia campaign, Lee moved n with 55,000 men through the Shenandoah Valley starting on September 4, 1862. His objective was to resupply his army exterior of the war-torn Virginia theater and to impairment Northern morale in anticipation of the Nov elections. He undertook the risky maneuver of splitting his army so that he could continue due north into Maryland while simultaneously capturing the Federal garrison and arsenal at Harpers Ferry. McClellan accidentally institute a copy of Lee'southward orders to his subordinate commanders and planned to isolate and defeat the separated portions of Lee's army.

While Confederate Maj. Gen. Stonewall Jackson surrounded, bombarded, and captured Harpers Ferry (September 12–fifteen), McClellan'due south ground forces of 102,000 men attempted to movement apace through the S Mountain passes that separated him from Lee. The Battle of South Mountain on September 14 delayed McClellan'south advance and immune Lee sufficient time to concentrate most of his army at Sharpsburg. The Battle of Antietam (or Sharpsburg) on September 17 was the bloodiest solar day in American military history with over 22,000 casualties. Lee, outnumbered two to one, moved his defensive forces to parry each offensive accident, but McClellan never deployed all of the reserves of his ground forces to capitalize on localized successes and destroy the Confederates. On September eighteen, Lee ordered a withdrawal across the Potomac and on September 19–xx, fights by Lee's rear guard at Shepherdstown ended the campaign.

Although Antietam was a tactical depict, it meant the strategy behind Lee's Maryland campaign had failed. President Abraham Lincoln used this Union victory as the justification for announcing his Emancipation Proclamation, which effectively ended whatever threat of European back up for the Confederacy.

Background [edit]

Military situation [edit]

Northern Virginia, Maryland and Pennsylvania (1861-1865)

Southern Virginia, (1861-1865)

The year 1862 started out well for Union forces in the Eastern Theater. George B. McClellan's Ground forces of the Potomac had invaded the Virginia Peninsula during the Peninsula Campaign and by June stood merely a few miles outside the Confederate capital at Richmond. Simply, when Robert E. Lee assumed control of the Army of Northern Virginia on June one, fortunes reversed. Lee fought McClellan aggressively in the 7 Days Battles; McClellan lost his nerve, and his army retreated down the Peninsula. Lee so conducted the northern Virginia campaign in which he outmaneuvered and defeated Maj. Gen. John Pope and his Army of Virginia, well-nigh significantly at the 2nd Battle of Bull Run (Second Manassas). Lee's Maryland campaign tin can be considered the final part of a logically connected, three-entrada, summertime offensive against Federal forces in the Eastern Theater.^[6]

The Confederates had suffered pregnant manpower losses in the wake of the summer campaigns. Nevertheless, Lee decided his army was fix for a great challenge: an invasion of the North. His goal was to accomplish the major Northern states of Maryland and Pennsylvania, and cut off the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad line that supplied Washington, D.C. His movements would threaten Washington and Baltimore, so equally to "annoy and harass the enemy."^[7]

Several motives led to Lee'southward conclusion to launch an invasion. First, he needed to supply his army and knew the farms of the North had been untouched by war, dissimilar those in Virginia. Moving the war northward would relieve pressure on Virginia. Second was the issue of Northern morale. Lee knew the Confederacy did not have to win the state of war by defeating the Due north militarily; information technology only needed to make the Northern populace and regime unwilling to continue the fight. With the Congressional elections of 1862 budgeted in November, Lee believed that an invading regular army playing havoc within the Northward could tip the balance of Congress to the Autonomous Political party, which might forcefulness Abraham Lincoln to negotiate an end to the state of war. He told Confederate President Jefferson Davis in a letter of September 3 that the enemy was "much weakened and demoralized."^[viii]

There were secondary reasons also. The Amalgamated invasion might be able to incite an uprising in Maryland, especially given that it was a slave-property state and many of its citizens held a sympathetic opinion toward the South. Some Confederate politicians, including Jefferson Davis, believed the prospect of strange recognition for the Confederacy would exist made stronger by a military victory on Northern soil, but there is no show that Lee idea the South should base its war machine plans on this possibility. Even so, the news of the victory at Second Bull Run and the beginning of Lee's invasion caused considerable diplomatic action betwixt the Confederate States and France and the United kingdom of great britain and northern ireland.^[9]

After the defeat of Pope at Second Bull Run, President Lincoln reluctantly returned to the man who had mended a cleaved army earlier—George B. McClellan, who had done information technology subsequently the Spousal relationship defeat at the First Battle of Balderdash Run (Start Manassas). He knew that McClellan was a strong organizer and a skilled trainer of troops, able to recombine the units of Pope's army with the Ground forces of the Potomac faster than anyone. On September two, Lincoln named McClellan to command "the fortifications of Washington, and all the troops for the defence force of the capital."^[10] The appointment was controversial in the Chiffonier, a bulk of whom signed a petition declaring to the president "our deliberate opinion that, at this time, it is not condom to entrust to Major General McClellan the command of whatsoever Ground forces of the United states of america."^[xi] The president admitted that it was like "curing the bite with the hair of the domestic dog." Just Lincoln told his secretarial assistant, John Hay, "We must employ what tools we accept. There is no man in the Army who can homo these fortifications and lick these troops of ours into shape half every bit well as he. If he tin can't fight himself, he excels in making others set to fight."^[12]

Opposing forces [edit]

Marriage [edit]

Marriage corps commanders
Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker (I Corps) Maj. Gen. Edwin V. Sumner (II Corps) Maj. Gen. Fitz John Porter (Five Corps) Maj. Gen. William B. Franklin (Half dozen Corps) Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside (IX Corps) Maj. Gen. Joseph K. Mansfield (XII Corps)

Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan's Ground forces of the Potomac, bolstered by units absorbed from John Pope'south Army of Virginia, included six infantry corps, about 102,000 men.^{[1] [xiii]}

• The I Corps, under Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, consisted of the divisions of Brig. Gens. Rufus Male monarch, James B. Ricketts, and George Yard. Meade.
• The II Corps, under Maj. Gen. Edwin V. Sumner, consisted of the divisions of Maj. Gens. State of israel B. Richardson and John Sedgwick, and Brig. Gen. William H. French.
• The V Corps, under Maj. Gen. Fitz John Porter, consisted of the divisions of Maj. Gen. George West. Morell, Brig. Gen. George Sykes, and Brig. Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys.
• The Half-dozen Corps, under Maj. Gen. William B. Franklin, consisted of the divisions of Maj. Gens. Henry W. Slocum and William F. "Baldy" Smith, and a division from the IV Corps nether Maj. Gen. Darius N. Couch.
• The 9 Corps, nether Maj. Gen. Ambrose East. Burnside, consisted of the divisions of Brig. Gens. Orlando B. Willcox, Samuel D. Sturgis, and Isaac P. Rodman, and the Kanawha Segmentation, under Brig. Gen. Jacob D. Cox.
• The XII Corps, under Maj. Gen. Joseph K. Mansfield, consisted of the divisions of Brig. Gens. Alpheus S. Williams and George Southward. Greene, and the cavalry division of Brig. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton.

During the march north into Maryland, McClellan inverse his army's control construction, appointing commanders for 3 "wings": the left, commanded by William B. Franklin, consisted of his own VI Corps plus the sectionalization of Darius Couch; the middle, nether Edwin Sumner, consisted of his II Corps and the XII Corps; the right, under Ambrose Burnside, consisted of his IX Corps (temporarily commanded by Maj. Gen. Jesse L. Reno until he was killed at South Mountain) and the I Corps. This wing organization was revoked just before the start of the Battle of Antietam.^[fourteen]

The army that McClellan took into Maryland was not an entirely cohesive or battle-set up fighting force. At its core were the Peninsula veterans of the II, V, and Half-dozen Corps, but a large portion of the army were untested rookie regiments or troops who had never fought every bit part of the Army of the Potomac. Some of the rookies had never even loaded their muskets, and others were unknowingly armed with lacking weapons.

McClellan had quickly integrated John Pope's iii corps into the principal army; these were redesignated every bit the I, Ix, and XII Corps. A number of new nine-month regiments were added to the army, including 2 entire new divisions commanded by Brig. Gens William French and Andrew Humphreys. Pope had blamed Fitz-John Porter for the defeat at 2d Bull Run and had him removed from command. McClellan rapidly restored his friend Porter to command of the V Corps, but afterward McClellan was terminated from command in October, Porter lost his protector and constitute himself court-martialed. He spent much of his life trying to rehabilitate himself. Irvin McDowell, also blamed for 2d Bull Run, was removed from command of the I Corps and replaced by Joe Hooker. Nathaniel Banks remained in command of the XII Corps until September 12, when he was fired.

The Iii Corps and XI Corps had both suffered severe losses at Second Balderdash Run and were most driven from the field in panic; they were left behind in Washington D.C. to residual and refit.

Of the half dozen corps that participated in the Maryland campaign, the Two and VI were the largest and most well-rested every bit neither had fought since the 7 Days Battles over two months before (aside from i brigade of the Half dozen Corps which had been attacked by the Confederates and routed while scouting nigh Bull Run). The Ii Corps received a new partitioning of nine calendar month troops commanded by Brig. Gen William French and the VI Corps had one new regiment; all the rest of the men in both corps had fought on the Peninsula. The I Corps was the smallest, as it had suffered heavy losses at Second Bull Run (one of its divisions had as well been heavily engaged in the Seven Days) and would lose still more than men at South Mountain; it'south estimated that the corps had 8000 men at Antietam out of a newspaper force of 14,000.

The Five Corps also consisted mostly of Peninsula veterans; Morell's sectionalisation had suffered astringent losses at 2d Bull Run and had its ranks filled out with green troops. A new division of 9-month regiments led past Brig. Gen Andrew A. Humphreys was added, but they would not arrive until later on Antietam.

The IX Corps had had two divisions at Second Balderdash Run (allowable by Full general Reno as Burnside was non present at the battle); for the Maryland campaign, it was joined past a third division under Brig. Gen Samuel Sturgis and Brig. Gen Jacob Cox's "Kanawah" Division, on loan from the Westward Virginia area. It included several dark-green regiments and the corps equally a whole was quite inexperienced equally Second Bull Run had been the only serious engagement it had fought in.

The XII Corps had not fought at 2nd Bull Run and its last engagement had been at Cedar Mountain a month earlier; some men from this corps were left in the Washington defenses and swapped for a number of light-green regiments. Afterwards Nathaniel Banks was fired on September 12, the senior division commander, Alpheus Williams, commanded the corps for a few days until Maj. Gen Joseph K. Mansfield, an onetime army officer with 40 years of service, was named to command.

Confederate [edit]

Confederate corps commanders
Maj. Gen. James Longstreet (I Corps) Maj. Gen. Stonewall Jackson (II Corps) Maj. Gen. J.Eastward.B. Stuart (Cav. Corps)

Full general Robert Eastward. Lee'south Army of Northern Virginia was organized into 2 large infantry corps, virtually 55,000 effectives at the beginning of September.^[15]

The Beginning Corps, under Maj. Gen. James Longstreet, consisted of the divisions of Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws, Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson, Brig. Gen. David R. Jones, Brig. Gen. John One thousand. Walker, Brig. Gen. John Bell Hood, and an independent brigade under Brig. Gen. Nathan G. "Shanks" Evans.

The 2d Corps, under Maj. Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson, consisted of the divisions of Brig. Gen. Alexander R. Lawton, Maj. Gen. A.P. Hill (the Calorie-free Partition), Brig. Gen. John R. Jones, and Maj. Gen. D.H. Loma.

The remaining units were the Cavalry Corps, under Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart, and the reserve artillery, commanded by Brig. Gen. William N. Pendleton. The 2nd Corps was organized with artillery fastened to each partition, in contrast to the Get-go Corps, which reserved its arms at the corps level.

One of the more unusual aspects of the Maryland campaign was the severely understrength condition of the Army of Northern Virginia. Robert East. Lee had commanded nearly xc,000 men in it when he causeless command of the army in June, but the 7 Days Battles cost him twenty,000 casualties and the northern Virginia campaign some other 12,000 or so. Forth with the marching into Maryland, the manpower of the army dropped even more than due to straggling, lack of food, and a pregnant number of soldiers in Virginia regiments deserting on the grounds that they had signed up to defend their country and non invade the N. Pregnant numbers of Confederate soldiers had no shoes and were unable to handle the macadamized roads of Maryland. Lee may have had nether 40,000 men on the field at Antietam, the smallest and most ragged his army would be until the final days of the Petersburg Siege. Many brigades were the size of regiments, their regiments company-sized. Despite the ragged condition of the army, morale was high and almost all of the Confederates were veterans, which put them at an advantage over the numerous green Union regiments.

The divisions of McLaws and D.H. Hill had been left in the Richmond surface area during the northern Virginia campaign; they quickly rejoined the ground forces for the march into Maryland. Lee was too reinforced by Brig. Gen John G. Walker'due south two-brigade division from North Carolina.

The exact size of the Army of Northern Virginia at Antietam has been a source of debate since the 19th century; apologists during the postwar years presented a picture of Lee beingness severely understrength and possibly having every bit few as 30,000 men on the field. Union generals and veterans of the war generally believed that the Army of Northern Virginia was not that small on September 17, and estimated Confederate strength as high as 50,000 men. It seems well-nigh certain that the most exhausted and understrength Confederate divisions were Lawton'due south and the Stonewall Segmentation, as both had been fighting and marching without any letup for 2 months. Other Confederate divisions such equally D.H. Hill'southward, had non fought since the Peninsula and would have been better rested and more physically fit. The lack of nutrient was a serious problem for the Army of Northern Virginia, as most crops were a month abroad from harvesting in September and many soldiers were forced to subsist on field corn and green apples, which gave them indigestion and diarrhea. Equally noted above, malnutrition was greatest in the two divisions of Jackson's old Valley Regular army due to two months of unbroken fighting and marching.

Initial movements [edit]

Maryland campaign, actions September 3–15, 1862

 Confederate

 Marriage

Confederate troops marching south on N Market Street, Frederick, Maryland, during the Civil War

On September 3, simply two days subsequently the Battle of Chantilly, Lee wrote to President Davis that he had decided to cross into Maryland unless the president objected. On the same mean solar day, Lee began shifting his army north and west from Chantilly towards Leesburg, Virginia. On September 4, advance elements of the Ground forces of Northern Virginia crossed into Maryland from Loudoun County. The main body of the army advanced into Frederick, Maryland, on September 7. The 55,000-man ground forces had been reinforced by troops who had been defending Richmond—the divisions of Maj. Gens. D.H. Hill and Lafayette McLaws and two brigades under Brig. Gen. John Yard. Walker—but they merely made upwards for the 9,000 men lost at Bull Run and Chantilly.^[sixteen]

Lee'southward invasion coincided with another strategic offensive by the Confederacy. Generals Braxton Bragg and Edmund Kirby Smith had simultaneously launched invasions of Kentucky.^[17] Jefferson Davis sent to all three generals a draft public announcement, with blank spaces bachelor for them to insert the proper noun of whatsoever land their invading forces might attain. Davis wrote to explain to the public (and, indirectly, the European Powers) why the S seemed to be changing its strategy. Until this indicate, the Confederacy had claimed it was the victim of aggression and was but defending itself confronting "strange invasion." Davis explained that the Confederacy was still waging a war of self-defense. He wrote there was "no design of conquest," and that the invasions were only an ambitious effort to strength the Lincoln government to let the S become in peace. "We are driven to protect our own land by transferring the seat of war to that of an enemy who pursues us with a relentless and apparently aimless hostility."^[18]

Davis'south draft announcement did not reach his generals until later on they had issued proclamations of their own. They stressed that they had come up equally liberators, non conquerors, to these border states, only they did not address the larger issue of the Amalgamated strategy shift as Davis had desired. Lee's annunciation appear to the people of Maryland that his army had come "with the deepest sympathy [for] the wrongs that have been inflicted upon the citizens of the republic allied to u.s. of the Due south by the strongest social, political, and commercial ties ... to assistance you in throwing off this foreign yoke, to enable you again to enjoy the inalienable rights of freemen."^[19]

Dividing Lee's army [edit]

Lee divided his army into four parts equally it moved into Maryland. After receiving intelligence of militia activity in Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, Lee sent Maj. Gen. James Longstreet to Boonsboro and then to Hagerstown. (The intelligence overstated the threat since simply xx militiamen were in Chambersburg at the time.)^[20] Maj. Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson was ordered to seize the Union arsenal at Harpers Ferry with three separate columns. This left simply the thinly spread cavalry of Maj. Gen. J.Due east.B. Stuart and the segmentation of Maj. Gen. D.H. Hill to guard the regular army's rear at South Mountain.^[21]

The specific reason Lee chose this risky strategy of splitting his ground forces to capture Harpers Ferry is not known. 1 possibility is that he knew it allowable his supply lines through the Shenandoah Valley. Before he entered Maryland he had assumed that the Federal garrisons at Winchester, Martinsburg, and Harpers Ferry would exist cut off and abandoned without firing a shot (and, in fact, both Winchester and Martinsburg were evacuated).^[22] Another possibility is that it was but a tempting target with many vital supplies just nigh indefensible.^[twenty] McClellan requested permission from Washington to evacuate Harpers Ferry and attach its garrison to his army, merely his request was refused.^[23]

Reactions to invasion [edit]

Lee'due south invasion was fraught with difficulties from the beginning. The Confederate Army's numerical strength suffered in the wake of straggling and desertion. Although he started from Chantilly with 55,000 men, inside x days this number had diminished to 45,000.^[24] Some troops refused to cross the Potomac River because an invasion of Union territory violated their beliefs that they were fighting simply to defend their states from Northern aggression. Countless others became ill with diarrhea after eating unripe "green corn" from the Maryland fields or fell out because their shoeless feet were bloodied on difficult-surfaced Northern roads.^[22] Lee ordered his commanders to bargain harshly with stragglers, whom he considered cowards "who desert their comrades in peril" and were therefore "unworthy members of an ground forces that has immortalized itself" in its recent campaigns.^[25]

Upon entering Maryland, the Confederates found footling support; rather, they were met with reactions that ranged from a absurd lack of enthusiasm, to, in almost cases, open hostility. Robert E. Lee was disappointed at the state'southward resistance, a status that he had non anticipated. Although Maryland was a slaveholding state, Confederate sympathies were considerably less pronounced amid the lower and middle classes, which generally supported the Union cause, than amongst the pro-secession legislature, the majority of the members of which hailed from Southern Maryland, an expanse virtually entirely economically dependent on slave labor. Furthermore, many of the fiercely pro-Southern Marylanders had already traveled south at the kickoff of the war to bring together the Confederate Army in Virginia. Merely a "few score" of men joined Lee's columns in Maryland.^[26]

Maryland and Pennsylvania, alarmed and outraged past the invasion, rose at once to arms. Pennsylvania Governor Andrew Curtin called for 50,000 militia to plow out, and he nominated Maj. Gen. John F. Reynolds, a native Pennsylvanian, to control them. (This acquired considerable frustration to McClellan and Reynolds's corps commander, Joseph Hooker, merely general-in-chief Henry W. Halleck ordered Reynolds to serve under Curtin and told Hooker to find a new division commander.) As far northward as Wilkes-Barre, church and courthouse bells rang out, calling men to drill.^[27]

In Maryland, panic was much more widespread than in Pennsylvania, which was non yet immediately threatened. Baltimore, which Lee incorrectly regarded as a hotbed of secession but waiting for the appearance of Confederate armies to revolt, took up the war call against him immediately.^[28]

When information technology was learned in Baltimore that Southern armies had crossed the Potomac, the reaction was one of instantaneous hysteria followed chop-chop by stoic resolution. Crowds milled in the street outside newspaper offices waiting for the latest bulletins, and the sale of liquor was halted to restrain the excitable. The public stocked up on food and other essentials, fearing a siege. Philadelphia was besides sent into a flurry of frenzied preparations, despite existence over 150 miles (240 km) from Hagerstown and in no immediate danger.^[29]

McClellan's pursuit [edit]

I did not believe before coming here that there was so much Union feeling in the state. ... The whole population [of Frederick] seemed to plow out to welcome us. When Genl McClellan came thro[ugh] the ladies nearly eat him upwards, they kissed his vesture, threw their arms around his horse's neck and committed all sorts of extravagances.

Brig. Gen. John Gibbon^[30]

McClellan moved out of Washington starting on September 7 with his 87,000-man army in a lethargic pursuit.^[31] He was a naturally cautious full general and assumed he would be facing over 120,000 Confederates. He also was maintaining running arguments with the regime in Washington, demanding that the forces defending the capital urban center report to him.^[32] The regular army started with relatively low morale, a consequence of its defeats on the Peninsula and at Second Bull Run, merely upon crossing into Maryland, their spirits were additional past the "friendly, most tumultuous welcome" that they received from the citizens of the state.^[33]

Although he was existence pursued at a leisurely footstep by Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan and the Spousal relationship Ground forces of the Potomac, outnumbering him more than than two to one, Lee chose the risky strategy of dividing his regular army to seize the prize of Harpers Ferry. While the corps of Maj. Gen. James Longstreet drove due north in the direction of Hagerstown, Lee sent columns of troops to converge and attack Harpers Ferry from 3 directions. The largest column, xi,500 men under Jackson, was to recross the Potomac and circle effectually to the due west of Harpers Ferry and set on information technology from Bolivar Heights, while the other two columns, under Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws (8,000 men) and Brig. Gen. John G. Walker (3,400), were to capture Maryland Heights and Loudoun Heights, commanding the boondocks from the east and southward.^[34]

The Army of the Potomac reached Frederick, Maryland, on September 13. At that place, Cpl. Barton Mitchell of the 27th Indiana Infantry discovered a mislaid copy of the detailed campaign plans of Lee'south army—Special Guild 191—wrapped around three cigars. The order indicated that Lee had divided his army and dispersed portions geographically, thus making each subject to isolation and defeat in particular. Upon realizing the intelligence value of this discovery, McClellan threw up his arms and exclaimed, "Now I know what to practise!" He waved the order at his old Ground forces friend, Brig. Gen. John Gibbon, and said, "Here is a newspaper with which if I cannot whip Bobbie Lee, I volition be willing to go habitation." He telegraphed President Lincoln: "I have the whole rebel force in front of me, but I am confident, and no fourth dimension shall be lost. I think Lee has made a gross fault, and that he volition exist severely punished for it. I have all the plans of the rebels, and volition take hold of them in their own trap if my men are equal to the emergency. ... Will transport you trophies." McClellan waited eighteen hours earlier deciding to take advantage of this intelligence. His delay squandered the opportunity to destroy Lee'south army.^[35]

On the dark of September 13, the Ground forces of the Potomac moved toward Due south Mount, with Burnside's right wing of the army directed to Turner'south Gap, and Franklin's left wing to Crampton's Gap. South Mountain is the name given to the continuation of the Blue Ridge Mountains after they enter Maryland. It is a natural obstacle that separates the Shenandoah Valley and Cumberland Valley from the eastern function of Maryland. Crossing the passes of South Mountain was the only way to achieve Lee'south regular army.^[36]

Lee, seeing McClellan's uncharacteristic aggressive actions, and possibly learning through a Confederate sympathizer that his lodge had been compromised,^[37] quickly moved to concentrate his regular army. He chose non to abandon his invasion and return to Virginia nonetheless, because Jackson had not completed the capture of Harpers Ferry. Instead, he chose to make a stand up at Sharpsburg, Maryland. In the concurrently, elements of the Army of Northern Virginia waited in defense of the passes of South Mountain.^[38]

Battles of the Maryland campaign [edit]

Harpers Ferry [edit]

As Jackson'south three columns approached Harpers Ferry, Col. Dixon Due south. Miles, Union commander of the garrison, insisted on keeping about of the troops near the town instead of taking upwardly commanding positions on the surrounding heights. The Southward Carolinians nether Brig. Gen. Joseph B. Kershaw encountered the slim defenses of the most important position, Maryland Heights, just only brief skirmishing ensued. Potent attacks by the brigades of Kershaw and William Barksdale on September 13 drove the mostly inexperienced Marriage troops from the heights.^[39]

During the fighting on Maryland Heights, the other Confederate columns arrived and were astonished to come across that critical positions to the west and s of town were non defended. Jackson methodically positioned his arms effectually Harpers Ferry and ordered Maj. Gen. A.P. Hill to move down the due west bank of the Shenandoah River in preparation for a flank attack on the Federal left the next morning time. By the morning time of September fifteen, Jackson had positioned nearly 50 guns on Maryland Heights and at the base of Loudoun Heights. He began a trigger-happy artillery barrage from all sides and ordered an infantry assault. Miles realized that the situation was hopeless and agreed with his subordinates to raise the white flag of surrender. Before he could surrender personally, he was mortally wounded by an arms shell and died the next mean solar day. Jackson took possession of Harpers Ferry and more than 12,000 Union prisoners, then led well-nigh of his men to bring together Lee at Sharpsburg, leaving Maj. Gen. A.P. Hill's sectionalisation to complete the occupation of the town.^[40]

Southward Mountain [edit]

Pitched battles were fought on September 14 for possession of the Southward Mount passes: Crampton'due south, Turner'due south, and Fox'due south Gaps. Maj. Gen. D.H. Hill defended Turner's and Fox'south Gaps against Burnside. To the south, Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws defended Crampton'due south Gap against Franklin, who was able to break through at Crampton's Gap, but the Confederates were able to concord Turner'southward and Fox'southward, if only precariously. (For the counter argument that the Union held Pull a fast one on'due south Gap, see Older, Curtis 50., Hood'southward Defeat Near Fox's Gap September 14, 1862.)^[41] Lee realized the futility of his position against the numerically superior Union forces, and he ordered his troops to Sharpsburg. McClellan was then theoretically in a position to destroy Lee'south ground forces before it could concentrate. McClellan'south limited activity on September 15 later his victory at S Mountain, however, condemned the garrison at Harpers Ferry to capture and gave Lee time to unite his scattered divisions at Sharpsburg.^[42]

Antietam (Sharpsburg) [edit]

Battle of Antietam (Sharpsburg), September 17, 1862

Amalgamated dead at Antietam

On September 16, McClellan confronted Lee most Sharpsburg. Lee was defending a line to the west of Antietam Creek. At dawn on September 17, Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker'southward I Corps mounted a powerful assail on Lee's left flank that began the bloody battle. Attacks and counterattacks swept across the Miller Cornfield and the woods near the Dunker Church as Maj. Gen. Joseph Chiliad. Mansfield's XII Corps joined to reinforce Hooker. Union assaults confronting the Sunken Route ("Bloody Lane") by Maj. Gen. Edwin Five. Sumner's II Corps eventually pierced the Amalgamated middle, just the Federal advantage was not pressed. In the afternoon, Burnside'south IX Corps crossed a stone bridge over Antietam Creek and rolled upward the Confederate right. At a crucial moment, A.P. Hill's sectionalization arrived from Harpers Ferry and counterattacked, driving dorsum Burnside'south men and saving Lee's army from devastation. Although outnumbered two to one, Lee committed his unabridged strength, while McClellan sent in only 4 of his six available corps. This enabled Lee to shift brigades across the battlefield and counter each individual Union assault. During the night, both armies consolidated their lines. In spite of crippling casualties—Union 12,401, or 25%; Confederate 10,316, or 31%—Lee continued to skirmish with McClellan throughout September 18, while transporting his wounded men south of the Potomac. McClellan did non renew the offensive. Later dark, Lee ordered the battered Army of Northern Virginia to withdraw across the Potomac into the Shenandoah Valley.^[43]

Shepherdstown [edit]

On September 19, a detachment of Maj. Gen. Fitz John Porter's V Corps pushed across the river at Boteler's Ford, attacked the Confederate rear guard allowable by Brig. Gen. William N. Pendleton, and captured four guns. Early on September 20, Porter pushed elements of ii divisions beyond the Potomac to found a bridgehead. A.P. Hill's division counterattacked while many of the Federals were crossing and nearly annihilated the 118th Pennsylvania (the "Corn Exchange" Regiment), inflicting 269 casualties. This rearguard action discouraged further Federal pursuit.^[44]

Aftermath and diplomatic implications [edit]

Lee successfully withdrew beyond the Potomac, ending the Maryland campaign and summer candidature altogether. President Lincoln was disappointed in McClellan'southward functioning. He believed that the general'south cautious and poorly coordinated actions in the field had forced the battle to a draw rather than a crippling Amalgamated defeat. He was even more astonished that from September 17 to October 26, despite repeated entreaties from the War Section and the president, McClellan declined to pursue Lee across the Potomac, citing shortages of equipment and the fear of overextending his forces. Full general-in-Main Henry Westward. Halleck wrote in his official study, "The long inactivity of then large an army in the face of a defeated foe, and during the most favorable season for rapid movements and a vigorous campaign, was a matter of great thwarting and regret."^[45] Lincoln relieved McClellan of his command of the Army of the Potomac on November 7, effectively catastrophe the general's military machine career. Maj. Gen. Ambrose Due east. Burnside rose to command the Army of the Potomac. The Eastern Theater was relatively serenity until Dec, when Lee faced Burnside at the Boxing of Fredericksburg.^[46]

Although a tactical draw, the Battle of Antietam was a strategic victory for the Union. It forced the end of Lee's strategic invasion of the North and gave Abraham Lincoln the victory he was awaiting before announcing the Emancipation Proclamation on September 22, which took effect on January 1, 1863. Although Lincoln had intended to practise then earlier, he was advised by his Chiffonier to brand this announcement after a Marriage victory to avoid the perception that information technology was issued out of desperation. The Amalgamated reversal at Antietam also dissuaded the governments of France and Dandy United kingdom from recognizing the Confederacy. And, with the issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation, it became less likely that future battlefield victories would induce foreign recognition. Lincoln had finer highlighted slavery as a tenet of the Amalgamated States of America, and the abhorrence of slavery in France and Great United kingdom of great britain and northern ireland would not allow for intervention on behalf of the South.^[47]

The Marriage lost xv,220 men during the Maryland campaign (2,535 killed, 11,426 wounded, 1,259 missing).^[48]

• 

  Maryland campaign, actions September 7 to 13, 1862 (Additional map 1)

• 

  Maryland entrada, actions September 3 to 13, 1862 (Additional map 2)

• 

  Maryland campaign, actions September 14 to fifteen, 1862 (Additional map three)

Run into likewise [edit]

• Armies in the American Civil War
• Commemoration of the American Civil State of war
• Celebration of the American Ceremonious War on postage stamps
• Listing of costliest American Ceremonious War land battles
• Troop engagements of the American Civil State of war, 1862
• USS Antietam

Notes [edit]

1. ^ ^{a b} V Corps (Porter): 21,000; I, II, VI, IX, XII Corps + Cav. Div.: 74,234; 3rd Div./V Corps: seven,000; Total Union strength: 102,234
   Further information: Official Records, Series I, Volume Xix, Function 1, p. 67, 374 and Official Records, Series I, Volume XIX, Role 2, p. 264.
2. ^ ^{a b} See Maryland entrada: Opposing forces
3. ^ Official Records, Series I, Book XIX, Part 1, p. 204
4. ^ Official Records, Serial I, Volume Xix, Part one, p. 549
5. ^ ten,291 Confederate casualties: 1,567 killed and viii,724 wounded for the unabridged Maryland campaign. See: Official Records, Series I, Volume Nineteen, Role one, pp. 810–13.
6. ^ Eicher, pp. 268–334; McPherson, pp. xxx–34, 44–47, 80–86.
7. ^ Sears, Mural, pp. 65-66; Esposito, text for map 65; Eicher, pp. 336–37.
8. ^ McPherson, pp. 89–92; Glatthaar, p. 164; Eicher, p. 337.
9. ^ McPherson, pp. 91–94; Eicher, p. 337.
10. ^ Rafuse, p. 268; McPherson, pp. 86–87.
11. ^ Sears, McClellan, p. 260.
12. ^ Bailey, Bloodiest Solar day, p. 15.
13. ^ 84,000 according to Eicher, p. 338.
14. ^ Sears, Mural, p. 102.
15. ^ Eicher, p. 337; O.R. Series 1, Vol. Nineteen part 2 (Due south# 28), p. 621; Luvaas and Nelson, pp. 294–300; Esposito, map 67; Sears, Landscape, pp. 366–72. Although virtually histories, including the Official Records, refer to these organizations every bit Corps, that designation was not formally made until November six, later on the Maryland campaign. Longstreet's unit of measurement was referred to as the Right Wing, Jackson'due south the Left Fly, for nigh of 1862. (Gen. Lee referred in official correspondence to these as "commands". See, for example, Luvaas and Nelson, p. iv.) Harsh, Sounding the Shallows, pp. 32–90, states that D.H. Hill was temporarily in control of a "Center Wing" with his own division (commanded initially by Brig. Gen. Roswell Due south. Ripley, and the divisions of Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws and Brig. Gen. John G. Walker. The other references list him strictly as a division commander.
16. ^ Sears, Landscape, p. 69.
17. ^ McPherson, p. 75; Sears, Landscape, p. 63. The word invasion has been used historically for these operations, and in the case of Kentucky it is valid. The Confederacy was attempting to regain territory information technology believed was its ain. In the instance of Maryland, notwithstanding, Lee had no plans to seize and concord Union territory, and therefore his actions would more than properly be described as a strategic raid or an incursion.
18. ^ Sears, Landscape, pp. 68–69.
19. ^ McPherson, p. 91; Sears, Landscape, pp. 68–69.
20. ^ ^{a b} Eicher, p. 339
21. ^ Bailey, p. 38.
22. ^ ^{a b} Sears, Landscape, p. 83.
23. ^ Rafuse, pp. 285–86.
24. ^ McPherson, p. 100.
25. ^ Glatthaar, p. 167; Esposito, map 65; McPherson, p. 100.
26. ^ McPherson, p. 98; Glatthaar, p. 166; Eicher, p. 339.
27. ^ McPherson, p. 101.
28. ^ Sears, Landscape, pp. 99–100.
29. ^ Sears, Landscape, pp. 100–01.
30. ^ McPherson, p. 105.
31. ^ Eicher, p. 339.
32. ^ Esposito, map 65; Eicher, p. 340.
33. ^ McPherson, pp. 104–05.
34. ^ Bailey, p. 39.
35. ^ Sears, Mural, p. 113; Glatthaar, p. 168; Eicher, p. 340; Rafuse, pp. 291–93; McPherson, pp. 108–09.
36. ^ Sears, Landscape, pp. 82–83; Eicher, p. 340.
37. ^ Sears, Mural, pp. 350–52. Full general Lee made no reference to the lost order in his 1862 reports, and it was not until 1863, after McClellan had published his own written report, that Lee acknowledged the circumstances of McClellan's intelligence notice. Withal, in interviews after the war, he mentioned the Confederate sympathizer who had supposedly witnessed McClellan reading the order. Discovery of these interviews prompted Douglas Southall Freeman to include this data in his 1946 Lee'southward Lieutenants (a revised view from his 1934 piece of work, the four volume biography of Lee), which has led to citations in subsequent sources. Sears argues that "there is substantial prove that in this instance Lee's retention failed him" and that the "conclusion seems inescapable that Lee learned from the Maryland civilian but that the Federal ground forces had suddenly become active" and zippo more.
38. ^ Esposito, map 56; Rafuse, p. 295; Eicher, p. 341.
39. ^ McPherson, p. 109; Esposito, map 66; Eicher, pp. 344–49.
40. ^ Eicher, pp. 345–47; Glatthaar, p. 168; Esposito, map 56; McPherson, p. 110.
41. ^ Older, Curtis Fifty., Hood'due south Defeat Near Fob'south Gap September xiv, 1862, Kindle and Apple Books.
42. ^ Eicher, pp. 341–44; McPherson, pp. 111–12; Esposito, map 66.
43. ^ McPherson, pp. 116–31; Esposito, maps 67–69; Eicher, pp. 348–63.
44. ^ Eicher, p. 363.
45. ^ Bailey, p. 67.
46. ^ McPherson, pp. 150–53; Esposito, map 70; Eicher, pp. 382–83.
47. ^ McPherson, pp. 138–39, 146–49; Eicher, pp. 365–66.
48. ^ "MGen McClellan's Official Reports". Antietam.aotw.org. Retrieved 24 November 2014.

References [edit]

• Bailey, Ronald H., and the Editors of Time-Life Books. The Bloodiest Day: The Battle of Antietam. Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1984. ISBN 0-8094-4740-1.
• Eicher, David J. The Longest Night: A War machine History of the Ceremonious War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001. ISBN 0-684-84944-5.
• Esposito, Vincent J. Due west Point Atlas of American Wars. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. OCLC 5890637. The collection of maps (without explanatory text) is bachelor online at the West Point website.
• Glatthaar, Joseph T. General Lee's Ground forces: From Victory to Plummet. New York: Costless Press, 2008. ISBN 978-0-684-82787-2.
• Harsh, Joseph L. Sounding the Shallows: A Amalgamated Companion for the Maryland Campaign of 1862. Kent, OH: Kent Land Academy Press, 2000. ISBN 0-87338-641-8.
• Luvaas, Jay, and Harold W. Nelson, eds. Guide to the Battle of Antietam. U.Due south. Army War Higher Guides to Civil War Battles. Lawrence: Academy Press of Kansas, 1987. ISBN 0-7006-0784-vi.
• McPherson, James Thou. Crossroads of Freedom: Antietam, The Battle That Changed the Course of the Civil War. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. ISBN 0-19-513521-0.
• Older, Curtis L., Hood's Defeat Well-nigh Flim-flam'due south Gap September fourteen, 1862. Kindle and Apple tree Books. ISBN 978-0-9960067-five-0.
• Rafuse, Ethan Southward. McClellan's War: The Failure of Moderation in the Struggle for the Union. Bloomington: Indiana University Printing, 2005. ISBN 0-253-34532-4.
• Sears, Stephen W. George B. McClellan: The Immature Napoleon. New York: Da Capo Press, 1988. ISBN 0-306-80913-three.
• Sears, Stephen Due west. Mural Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1983. ISBN 0-89919-172-10.
• Wolff, Robert Southward. "The Antietam Campaign." In Encyclopedia of the American Civil War: A Political, Social, and Military History, edited by David S. Heidler and Jeanne T. Heidler. New York: W. West. Norton & Visitor, 2000. ISBN 0-393-04758-Ten.
• National Park Service battle descriptions

Memoirs and primary sources [edit]

• Dawes, Rufus R. A Full Blown Yankee of the Atomic number 26 Brigade: Service with the Sixth Wisconsin Volunteers. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1999. ISBN 0-8032-6618-9. First published 1890 by East. R. Alderman and Sons.
• Douglas, Henry Kyd. I Rode with Stonewall: The State of war Experiences of the Youngest Member of Jackson'due south Staff. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Printing, 1940. ISBN 0-8078-0337-5.
• "Brady's Photographs: Pictures of the Expressionless at Antietam". New York Times. New York. October 20, 1862.
• U.S. War Department, The War of the Rebellion: a Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Washington, DC: U.Due south. Government Printing Part, 1880–1901.

Further reading [edit]

• Ballard, Ted. Battle of Antietam: Staff Ride Guide. Washington, DC: Usa Army Center of Military History, 2006. OCLC 68192262.
• Cannan, John. The Antietam Campaign: August–September 1862. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1994. ISBN 0-938289-91-viii.
• Carman, Ezra Ayers. The Maryland Campaign of September 1862. Vol. 1, Due south Mountain. Edited by Thomas G. Clemens. El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2010. ISBN 978-1-932714-81-four.
• Carman, Ezra Ayers. The Maryland Campaign of September 1862: Ezra A. Carman'southward Definitive Business relationship of the Union and Confederate Armies at Antietam. Edited by Joseph Pierro. New York: Routledge, 2008. ISBN 0-415-95628-5.
• Cooling, Benjamin Franklin. Counter-thrust: From the Peninsula to the Antietam. Lincoln & London: University of Nebraska Press, 2007. ISBN 978-0-8032-1515-3.
• Gallagher, Gary W., ed. Antietam: Essays on the 1862 Maryland Campaign. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1989. ISBN 0-87338-400-8.
• Harsh, Joseph L. Amalgamated Tide Ascension: Robert E. Lee and the Making of Southern Strategy, 1861–1862. Kent, OH: Kent Land University Press, 1998. ISBN 0-87338-580-2.
• Harsh, Joseph Fifty. Taken at the Flood: Robert E. Lee and Confederate Strategy in the Maryland Campaign of 1862. Kent, OH: Kent State Academy Press, 1999. ISBN 0-87338-631-0.
• Hartwig, H. Scott., To Antietam Creek: The Maryland Entrada of 1862. Baltimore MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012. ISBN 978-one-4214-0631-2.
• Jamieson, Perry D. Death in September: The Antietam Campaign. Abilene, TX: McWhiney Foundation Press, 1999. ISBN 1-893114-07-4.
• Murfin, James 5. The Gleam of Bayonets: The Battle of Antietam and the Maryland Campaign of 1862. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Printing, 1965. ISBN 0-8071-0990-8.
• Orrison, Robert, and Kevin R. Pawlak. To Hazard All: A Guide to the Maryland Campaign, 1862. Emerging Civil War Series. El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2018. ISBN 978-1-61121-409-3.
• Perry D. Jamieson and Bradford A. Wineman, The Maryland and Fredericksburg Campaigns, 1862–1863. Washington, DC: U.s. Regular army Heart of Military History, 2015. CMH Pub 75-6.
• Older, Curtis L. Hood's Defeat Well-nigh Fob's Gap September fourteen, 1862. Kindle and Apple Books. ISBN 978-0-9960067-5-0.

External links [edit]

• The Battle of Antietam: Battle Maps, histories, photos, and preservation news (Civil State of war Trust)
• Battle of Antietam Animated Map (Civil War Trust)
• Antietam National Battleground Park
• Antietam on the Web
• Atlas of the battlefield of Antietam (Library of Congress).
• Blithe history of the Battle of Antietam
• Official Reports from Antietam
• Official Records: The Battle of Antietam (Sharpsburg),"the bloodiest day of the Civil War" (September 17, 1862)
• USS Antietam
• Collection of pictures by Alexander Gardner
• Online transcription of 1869 record of original Confederate Burials in Washington Canton, Maryland, including Antietam Battlefield {Washington County Maryland Costless Library-for reference only}
• History of Antietam National Cemetery, including a descriptive listing of all the loyal soldiers buried therein, published 1869
• Hagerstown Herald of Freedom and Torch Light Sept 1862, offset edition after the Boxing of Antietam
• Brotherswar.com The Battle of Antietam
• Map of North America and American Civil War at time of the Boxing of Antietam at omniatlas.com

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Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maryland_campaign

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